Croatia has voted for joining the European Union, with the 22.00 CET figure tonight being 66.25% in favour. We will take a closer look at the result in the next couple of days.
Full referendum details can be seen at the official DIP website. See also our popular twitter service for updates.
Sunday sees the EU referendum in Croatia. Although opinions polls suggest a majority in favour of joining, there is still considerable euro-scepticism in Croatia, as reflected in recent reports in the Daily Telegraph and the New York Times. Certainly at CBR we rarely come across any Croat who has a good word for the EU. However, there is a pragmatic reason for Croatia to join the EU that may well be on the minds of those voting yes: membership is a way of moving away from the Balkan/ex-Yugoslav mess that some would like Croatia to be part of.
There are many valid arguments that Euro-sceptics in Croatia are using. Firstly, there is the Eurozone crisis – what benefit is there in joining that, let alone possibly helping pay for bail-outs?
Further, there are historical grievances. In 1991, the EU were none too keen on recognising Croatia and Slovenia, and preferred to deal with Slobodan Milosevic. Germany had to use its influence to get Croatia recognised – which it was, but only after Vukovar had fallen.
Even giving Croatia candidate status came with initial strings. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was a thinly veiled attempt to re-create some form of Balkan Federation, requiring various agreements with ex-Yugoslav states, minus Slovenia plus Albania. Reality intervened with events such as conflict in Macedonia and the assassination of Zoran Djindic, which effectively derailed the policy.
The Gotovina case is something that Croats rightly were annoyed with the EU about – the EU had delayed Croatia’s accession over the issue. It turned out he wasn’t in Croatia at all, contrary to claims that he was. Further, the EU were then not helpful in handing over documents to his defence team.
Certainly Croatia will have no say in the major policies in the EU – it is disingenuous to say otherwise. Germany is in charge at the moment – not unreasonably given its expected to pay up to save the Eurozone. Although it must be said that German dominance in the EU is obviously not to liking of many in say, the UK, but fortunately for Croatia, Germany is a friend and will not likely do anything to damage the country – although its interest will always come first.
Joining the failing Euro currency is not in Croatia’s interest, and regardless of any commitments to join it should be avoided.
There are plenty more arguments against Croatia joining the EU, and need not be repeated here.
However, despite all these very valid issues there is one good, pragmatic reason to join. Historically, the idea of joining the EU was to get out of the ex-Yugoslav ‘region’ and the Balkans and join with it natural partners such as Italy, Germany and Austria and so on. There are still many pressure on Croatia to be involved in ‘regional cooperation’, the ‘Balkans’, ‘the region’, ‘Yugosphere’ etc. Those pressures would lessen – if not just yet completely go away – with the reality of Croatia being in the EU. This is probably in the minds of many Croats who are going to vote ‘yes’, and indeed some homeland veterans associations are supporting entry for this reason.
Those worried about the authoritarian mentality of the EU – which recently forced government changes in Italy and Greece – should consider that the EU is clearly in trouble and could yet change into something far looser in a few years time.
Joining the EU, even if it is falling apart, at least puts Croatia into the European political mainstream, rather than being regarded as part of the impoverished and unstable Balkans – an image problem that could cost investment and tourism. Incidentally, Zagreb needs to carefully consider that issue when it talks of regional cooperation – do they really want to be wrongly associated with problems such as the violence in North Kosovo?
Joining the EU would certainly help place Croatia back to where culturally, economically and historically it already belongs –in Europe and not in the ‘Balkans’.
Over at the Economist, Tim Judah is now using the 2006 Eurovision Song Contest to substantiate the ‘Yugosphere’ – the term which we have comprehensively criticised quite a few times. He refers to the ‘Yugosphere’ as being ‘so-called’, as if others have originated the term. However, it is ‘so-called’ by none other than Tim Judah who originated the odd term, who uses it the most, and even links to his paper on it.
All rather strange.
However, there is a more serious point here. Quite a few people have little idea of what goes in ex-Yugoslav states, let alone the rest of the central and eastern European states. Some may be misled into thinking the ‘Yugosphere’ is for real because it appears in the Economist. They may be surprised to learn that Croatia is pretty much economically integrated with the EU, rather than the ‘Yugosphere’.
Further, 2011 saw extreme, and continuing, tension in North Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs – to which Judah refers to. Such tension may also come as a surprise to people who have heard of some ‘Yugosphere’ in which Yugoslavia is making a kind of comeback.
Talk of a Yugosphere is a barrier to understanding – and surely the ex-Yugoslav states have had enough of that?
If there is one thing CBR hopes for in 2012, then it is that such tiresome dogmatic thinking about ‘Yugospheres’, ‘the region’, ‘West Balkans’, ‘South East Europe’ or whatever euphemism is finally dispensed with and these countries are given the dignity of being looked at in realistic terms, rather than ideological ones.
A belated happy New Year to all our readers! We also hope you had a peaceful and happy Christmas.
We will be starting off our 2012 coverage very shortly indeed – later tonight, in fact. And we will of course be later looking at the EU referendum due in Croatia on 22 January.
The left wing Kukuriku coalition has won the elections, gaining 80 seats – giving them a majority in the Croatian parliament. The HDZ gained 47 seats. As we pointed out, the HDZ are usually underestimated at polls, and they did indeed gain more seats than some polls predicted. However, given the scale of the defeat, it is effectively negligible and will be of scant comfort to them. Indeed, it is their worst result ever.
The question now is how will be coalition govern? They have implied that they will make strong spending cuts and go to the IMF for help. The ratings agency Fitch has said that the government will have to sort out debt, effectively placing more pressure on the government to make spending cuts.
Amongst all this, little is being said about how to stimulate business in Croatia. How will small and medium businesses be helped to grow and expand? Such businesses keep the country going –whether it is a small guesthouse or a new technology firm.
One looming issue is the EU referendum, due in February. Whilst Croats are likely – grudgingly – to vote to join, events in the Eurozone could yet have a major impact. That aside, the coalition should deepen, maintain and extend links with European states, especially traditional partners such as Germany, Austria and so on. President Josipovic has appeared more concerned with forging links with poorer Serbia, to no discernible benefit. Given the economic situation, it is to be hoped that the coalition will not follow Josipovic’s lead. Despite the current crisis, the EU remains a wealthy market for Croatia – a lack of focus there would not be helpful, but a greater one may produce rewards.
As for the HDZ? Whilst they may blame their result on media coverage, their defeat is self-inflicted. Had there been no corruption issue, they would not be in the situation they are in. Power was thrown away in favour of – at the very least – less than transparent dealings. The spectacle of Ivo Sanader first suddenly resigning, then being extradited from Austria to face corruption charges had its impact. Croats are essentially conservative with a small ‘c’ – such incidents do not go down well with people who prefer stable and respectable governments.
That said, the HDZ should not be underestimated, they have shown a capacity for reinvention and renewal. They will need to swiftly sort themselves out corruption wise and not fall into factions. However, should the Kukuriku coalition prove simply to be competent, the HDZ may have a long spell in opposition.
This Sunday sees the Croatian parliamentary elections. The contest is essentially between the ruling Conservative HDZ led coalition and the left-wing SDP led Kukuriku coalition.
The ruling coalition has been beset by corruption scandals. Most notably, the former HDZ Prime Minister is currently on trial on corruption charges. Further, the party itself is being investigated by anti-corruption officials. This has hit the party hard in the opinion polls, and the SDP led Kukuriku coalition consequently looks set to win the election.
The HDZ has not given in. Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor has tried to turn the corruption issue to her advantage by pointing out that she is not resisting any anti-corruption efforts. Further, she is hoping that Croatia’s current success in moving forward with EU accession – the EU parliament has just approved it – will help her.
Another element of the HDZ strategy has been to suggest that that the SDP have not really changed from their communist roots. This plays on a great divide in Croatian society between those previously associated – to a greater or lesser degree – with the old communist party/state and those who were not. This is not often remarked on in the English speaking media but is certainly exist and does determine a great many votes. However, a number of wags point out that the HDZ is also an ex-communist party due to the number of former party members it has.
HDZ strategists will no doubt also be hoping the opinion polls are wrong. The HDZ are usually underestimated in opinion polls. If the HDZ does indeed lose its not likely to be as a bad as polls suggest, which would be in keeping with past experience.
None of the above may be enough to save the HDZ from defeat. Certainly a poll released yesterday does not bode well for them, predicting 79 seats for the opposition and 42 for the HDZ – plus three from the diaspora vote. The HDZ would need to do better on the day to be able to form even a theoretical coalition with other small parties.
The public are weary of the corruption issue, and whilst fingers have been pointed at the Kukuriku coalition, especially at a local level, it is the HDZ who are in government. Further, there is discontent regarding the economy. The Kukuriku coalition may well be right to feel confident.
Foreign policy change?
In the event of a Kukuriku win, it is likely that the HNS’s Vesna Pusic will become foreign minister. She already has a foreign profile due to her being a vice-president of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party. Something to watch out for will be her relations with neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). She has shown concern over the status of Croats in BiH. There is considerable controversy over their effective disenfranchisement form power structures.
Pusic’s new interest is remarkable; she was well known for severely criticising President Franjo Tudjman for his support of BiH Croats, and had herself no time for them. Her recent comment on the issue represents one of Croatia’s biggest political U-turns. This is very likely due to strategic reasons; Croats in BiH represent a buffer zone for much of Dalmatia.
This is hardly an election issue, and has gone more or less unremarked in the English language media. However, if she sticks to her line should she become foreign minister, there could be friction with neighbouring BiH – Sarajevo are not well inclined towards its Croats. And some in the international community may not be pleased. This will be one to watch.
Published 17 November in Hrvatski Vjesnik (Australia)
18 November 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of the Yugoslav army reducing Vukovar to rubble. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has failed to bring those responsible to justice. Only six figures were charged in relation to Vukovar, with many senior Yugoslav army figures left alone.* Possibly the most notorious case is that of Veselin Šljivančanin. He was convicted of crimes in relation to the notorious Ovcara massacre. After an unprecedented second appeal, his previous sentence of 17 years was reduced to ten. He was released earlier this year having served just 6 and a half years. The reasons for his release, as outlined by Judge Patrick Robinson, President of the ICTY, reveal just how much contempt the ICTY has for the victims of Vukovar and war crimes more generally.
ICTY prisoners can be reviewed for possible release after serving two thirds of their sentence. Having had his sentence reduced to ten years in December 2010, Sljivancanin applied for early release.
In his decision to release Sljivancanin, Judge Robinson points out that the Appeals Chamber “…observed that Mr. Sljivancanin’s aiding and abetting the torture of approximately 200 prisoners of war was an extremely serious crime.” Robinson himself was thus “..of the view that Mr. Sljivancanin’s crimes are of a high gravity, and that this is a factor that weighs against granting him early release. “
However, due to ICTY practice with other prisoners he says that “…the amount of time that Mr. Sljivancanin has served militates in favour of his early release.” Simply serving some time is in his favour to be released.
Judge Robinson informs us of the views oft the view of the Deputy Commanding Officer of the United Nations Detention Unit,. Sljivancanin has shown respect to the staff, followed the rules, maintained ‘good relations’ with a ‘wide group’ of other prisoners. Further, it would appear that he “…regularly assists in the library and has been heavily involved in the reorganization of the facility to the benefit of all detainees.”
He gets on well with his family, it seems and had apparently adjusted well to civilian life after being in the Yugoslav army committing war crimes.
What of his crimes, what remorse has he shown for his behavior? Apparently he has shown remorse for the events all over the ex-Yugoslavia, but not for his own crimes, as “.does not link the fate of the victims to his own actions.” No remorse at all then.
Another ground for release examined by the judge was cooperation with prosecution. Unsurprisingly, there was none.
His lack of remorse alone would have prevented his release, one would have thought – but Sljivancanin was released anyway. Of course, given what he was convicted for, some might think he should never have been released.
Sljivancanin was released for showing ‘some’ rehabilitation i.e. he behaved well in prison. He had also served some time – as if serving time was some inconvenience which he was brave to suffer. The gravity of Sljivancanin’s crimes, contrary to Robinson’s claims, counted for nothing – how else could he be released?
The feelings of the relatives of Sljivancanin’s victims were of course not considered – the ICTY and the human rights community seems to consider such people irrelevant.
The ICTY and its’human rights’ supporters keep telling people how such tribunals mean an end to impunity and so on. However, the message appears to be that if you are convicted for heinous war crimes, you can be released after a few years without showing any remorse. One might consider this attitude to be somewhat counter-productive in deterring future war crimes.
Earlier this year, Goran Hadzic was sent to The Hague to stand trial for Serbian crimes at Vukovar. Like all the other Vukovar related ICTY cases so far concluded, this one is likely to end badly. 20 years on, many of the victims and their relatives, will be remembering the horrors of Vukovar. One wonders how Hadzic will be marking this anniversary, awaiting his trial. Perhaps, if he has studied the reasons for releasing Sljivancanin, he will be ensuring he gets on well with staff and inmates and helping out in the prison library.
*Correction. This should have read as six cases, featuring nine individuals.
